S E C R E T

1 July 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Clandestine Service
Historical Board
Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Clandestine Service Historical Program

REFERENCE : A. Memorandum for C/CS Historical Board,
18 May 1971
B. HR 1-2c(3), 22 October 1970
C. CS/HPM-39, 7 April 1971

1. The following points might be usefully covered in a discussion of the CS historical program with the Deputy Director for Plans:

    a. The relationship of the CS historical program to the overall Agency program and those of other directorates.

    b. Formulation of the on-going historical program.

    c. Selection and assignment of writers.

    d. Security controls and readership.

Comments on the program relating to the above points follow. Recommendations are contained in paragraph 9.

2. Objectives: According to HR 1-2c(3) the total CIA program has as its objective "recording (1) the role of the Director of Central Intelligence as the coordinator of the United States intelligence effort;

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

(2) the performance of the Central Intelligence Agency in the support of national security." The histories are to serve as "background reading and orientation for operating officials." There are, however, other purposes the histories could and should serve. Selected histories or portions of histories could be used as reference and background material for the Office of Training and as documentation for responses to queries from the White House or the Congress. There are still other purposes a given history might serve, which could be specified either before or after the history is written. The historical program need not be entirely oriented to the past; it can contribute to current and developing Agency programs.

3. Relation to overall Agency and other directorate histories: Reference A contains a recommendation that the CS historical program be directed separately from the overall Agency program, and a discussion in support of that recommendation. It must be recognized at the same time that histories of certain other portions of the Agency are not and cannot be written without reflecting in some degree CS history and operations during the periods covered, most notably overall DCI history and much of the history of the DDS. This raises two related issues: (a) What use will be made of the non-CS histories and who will have access to them now and in the immediate future? (b) Who should determine what aspects of CS activity should be reflected in other histories, and in what detail?

Certainly neither the present Chief nor the Deputy Chief of the CIA Historical Staff is qualified to make these determinations. The Secretary of the CS Historical Board would come closer to having that capability but he would need guidance from the Board on general policy and

- 2 -

S E C R E T

SECRET

from time to time on specific questions of operational security. This, however, would mean a more active involvement in the program by members of the Board than has been possible in the past. Another possibility would be a separate review panel, which could include a representative from CI Staff, to rule on these and related problems.

4. <u>Progress</u>: The present CS program (164 histories completed and about 136 projected) was formulated in consultation between the components and the Historical Board. For the most part they are organizational histories of Headquarters components and field stations, but there are also a number of monographs in the program. Progress in completing the catch-up phase (1945-65) has been uneven. Some components will complete their portions of this phase of the program by the end of 1971, or will come close to doing so. Others will apparently fall far short. For a variety of reasons many of the components have not been able to assign an adequate number of qualified writers to the program: ceiling reductions, operational and program priorities, and restrictions on the re-hiring of annuitants. Also, enthusiasm for the program is by no means uniform throughout the CS.

Thus far major component and station histories have been neglected. The assignment of many of the writers to the historical program has been of limited duration and the understandable tendency has been to assign them units of history that are within their capabilities to complete. As a result little or no progress has been made on writing of

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- 3 -

SECRET

S E C R E T

5. <u>Content and Priorities</u>: As the present phase draws to a close, the CS historical program should be subjected to examination and revision. Some histories could be eliminated with no significant loss to the program. We would not recommend that preparation of organizational histories be abandoned but, so far as field installations are concerned, emphasis should be on major stations. Many of the smaller stations and bases could be eliminated or placed far down the list of priorities. We should prepare more monographs - detailed studies of particular subjects or episodes. Detailed reviews of the Penkovskiy and █████████ operations would be of more value than the histories of the █████████████████ stations (which have been published).

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6. <u>Personnel</u>: Many otherwise excellent CS officers are not capable of doing adequate historical research and writing and too many of them have been detailed to the historical program simply because they are available or nearing retirement. Some of them fumble away their time and if they do produce a draft it is often unusable or, at best, requires extensive re-working by someone else. The program could proceed more effectively with a lesser number of writers, but all qualified, motivated and available for at least a two-year tour.

7. <u>Security and Access</u>: Current CS Historical Board instructions specify that drafts and completed histories be hand-carried between the office of the Historical Staff in Rosslyn and the originating components. The finished, approved draft is typed in final form in two copies and bound at Rosslyn. One copy of the published history is delivered to the office of the DDP and one to the component custodian. Requests for access to a published history are referred to the originating component;

- 4 -

S E C R E T

SECRET

the component chief or his designated representative grants access. The history is checked out for reading in the originating office or may be taken to other, appropriately secured CIA offices for such time as needed. The most recent instruction s concerning control and readership of CS histories are contained in CS/HPM-39 of 7 April 1971, a copy of which is attached.

DDS histories are generally less strictly controlled although a few of the more sensitive ones (e.g. covert procurement) are published in one copy and are closely held.

There are loopholes in the security procedures described above. Generally the problem lies in ensuring compliance with instructions by the some 15-20 CS components involved. In spite of instructions to the contrary, draft histories are occasionally sent to Rosslyn by courier instead of being hand-carried. Writers or researchers could conceivably retain early drafts, notes, and copies of sensitive documents used in preparation of histories which are sometimes more sensitive than the histories themselves. Once a history leaves his office the component custodian has no really effective control over the document or its readership. It could be passed to others with no record of their having seen it; portions or all of it could be reproduced or removed from Agency premises. While security can never be absolute it could be improved as noted in paragraph 9 below.

8. Utilization and Readership: While access to the histories should be limited and controlled, those who have a legitimate need to consult them should know of their existence and be encouraged (and in some cases required) to read them. This again would devolve on component chiefs and historical officers. Current reports on readership indicate that it is less than it should be. According to reports from the components, some histories have not been read at all during the past year. Other histories, notably those concerning the larger and more active field stations are frequently read, 8-10 readers a year.

- 5 -

SECRET

S E C R E T

9. Recommendations:

a. The CS historical program should be directed from within the Clandestine Service. There should be guidance from the CIA Historical Staff, and continuing consultation and coordination, but no active direction.

b. The CS Historical Board, after consultation with the components should immediately begin formulation of a new list of studies to be prepared. The subjects should be arranged in order of priority and subject to continuing revision. Histories approaching completion should be finished and (if acceptable) published. Others may be given low priority or dropped from the program.

c. The Board should assume a more active role in the selection of writers, and in their assignments and direction.

d. The Secretary, with the approval of the Board, should consolidate and tighten instructions concerning the security of the program and access to published histories. This would include, subject to agreement with other directorates, non-CS histories which describe CS operations and projects.

e. The Board and the DDP should urge full but proper use of published histories by CS components and, where appropriate, outside the Clandestine Service.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

    f. The CS Historical Staff, for reasons
       of security and efficiency, should be
       provided office and vault space in the
       main Headquarters building.

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Executive Secretary
CS Historical Board

- 7 -

S E C R E T